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US COIN Doctrine and
Practice: An Ally’s Perspective
ALEXANDER ALDERSON

U

ntil very recently, the four and a half years of military operations in Iraq
appeared to have created an obstacle in people’s minds. Rightly or
wrongly, reality has subsumed theory, and because of the media coverage Iraq
has received, counterinsurgency is now seen as nothing but an indescribably
bloody, draining, protracted, and arduous business which makes tremendous
demands on popular support, political resolve, and the resources required to
sustain the fight. History shows this has always been the case, but perhaps the
initial incidences of rapid, decisive, conventional operations misled the public. The fact remains: The cost of counterinsurgency is high. It always has
been, depressingly so, and it is largely unrefundable. There is now more than
a glimmer of hope, a detectable, increasingly palpable feeling that something
may be changing, that there is now what can be best described as “a reasonable degree of tactical momentum on the ground.”1
Leadership, more troops, focused training during preparation for deployment, and the application of hard-learned lessons from four and a half
years at war are playing their part. A new factor is present, one that is fundamental to overcoming many of the initial obstacles and a factor that was absent when the insurgencies started to emerge from the shadows to so bedevil
the stabilization efforts in Iraq. That factor is doctrine, and the publication of
US Army Field Manual 3-24 and US Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
3-33.5 provides American participants with a counterinsurgency doctrine applicable, as the authors intended, to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
for similar operations well into the second decade of this century.
The development of FM 3-24 is notable for at least two reasons. 2
First, the writing team canvassed and included a far wider range of opinion
and expertise than is normally the case in developing such documents, giving
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the doctrine a wider applicability than simply how to win in Iraq. Second, and
arguably of greater importance, the speed with which both the doctrine was
produced, incorporating that wider view, and at the same time the entire education and training systems were revamped was unprecedented. The project
underlines the fact that there is much more to the development and implementation of doctrine than the publication of a pamphlet. Outcomes depend on the
approach that the doctrine describes being taught, understood, and executed.
To be effective, doctrine must be assimilated, absorbed into the military culture, and then sensibly applied to the prevailing conditions.
This article offers an assessment on the development of US counterinsurgency doctrine and one view of how it has been applied to operations in the
field. The hypothesis is that FM 3-24 conveys an effective military doctrine.
Although its utility to the soldier and marine is evident from the reports emanating from Iraq, it is equally clear that FM 3-24 is not the final answer. What
David Galula identifies as the 80 percent political action formula is beyond the
scope of FM 3-24, but it still needs to be addressed.3 The article provides a brief
but necessary reminder of doctrine’s function and identifies six criteria for
evaluating doctrine to be utilized in examining FM 3-24, testing its theoretical
effectiveness. It then offers commentary on counterinsurgency practice in Iraq
in the light of the new doctrine before returning to Galula’s missing 80 percent.
The hypothesis is supported by interviews with authors of the doctrine, service
members serving and others who have served in Iraq, post-operational reports,
and the ever-growing body of literature. Some careful consideration has also
been given to opinion pieces and editorials published in various media.

Writing COIN Doctrine
Writing counterinsurgency doctrine today faces two major hurdles.
First, things have changed markedly since the problem was last considered.
John Mackinlay, David Kilcullen, and Steven Metz are three contemporary
authors who have pointed out that warning signs related to this change have
existed for some time.4 There is little doubt that we are at a historic turning
point in the evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine, doctrine which is
reasonably well-known and better understood. The tools that governments
have available today are quite different from those available for El Salvador,
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Northern Ireland, and the Balkans, he joins Multi-National Force-Iraq in December 2007
to be Chief of Strategy, Concepts, and Plans.
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Vietnam, Algeria, Northern Ireland, or Malaya. Interdepartmental and international cooperation, a key feature of past campaigns, is rusty and the organizational understanding between governments is once again a work in
progress. Second, and as a result of the first hurdle, counterinsurgent forces
face the same challenges as their predecessors in coming up with answers to
post-Maoist insurgencies: One part of a complex, multifaceted solution cannot be expected to come up with the complete answer in one simple move. It
would be completely unrealistic then for anyone to expect that the Army
could. History demonstrates that solutions to such challenges evolve from an
incremental process that takes time and any number of iterations.
While insurgency remains a highly political form of warfare, its character, not its nature, has changed. FM 3-24 sees the insurgent-counterinsurgent
struggle as a “complex subset of warfare,”5 what Colin Gray terms “organized
violence threatened or waged for political purposes.”6 As a form of warfare, deriving a Gray analogy, insurgency cannot change its nature any more than a cat
can become a dog. But some cats are tigers, and this is the likely cause of the
confusion regarding the nature and character of such conflict. The problem is
infinitely more complex and is potentially much more dangerous than previously might have been the case. But this does not change the basic character of
the threat: “An organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to
weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying
power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”7
Today’s challenge of complexity and ever-evolving threats do not
change the insurgent’s and the counterinsurgent’s focus on the population
whose support, consent, and tolerance remain critical to countering any insurgency. This means that the balance of effort in a counterinsurgency campaign
is still, as David Galula pointed out, at least 80 percent political and 20 percent military.8 The admonition from General Sir Frank Kitson, arguably the
most influential British counterinsurgency theorist and practitioner, still
rings true: “There can be no such thing as a purely military solution because
insurgency is not primarily a military activity.”9 No matter how radical and
complex an insurgency may be, and however the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are interpreted, counterinsurgency is still not a military activity and
current doctrine should reflect that fact.

Doctrine and Its Effectiveness
In 1926 Major General J. F. C. Fuller, the father of British military
doctrine, identified three fundamentals of military doctrine when he stated:
“The central idea of an army . . . to be sound must be based on the principles of
war, and to be effective must be elastic enough to admit to mutation in accorWinter 2007-08
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dance with change in circumstance.” 10 Doctrine provides the bridge from
theory to practice, based on an understanding of experience. It informs practitioners how and what to think about a problem. How far it goes from “how to
think” to “what to think” is largely determined by the education, training, and
experience of the force for which it is written. The better the education and
training and the greater the experience, the less resource needs to be expended
on what to think. Whether it is how or what, provided the doctrine is updated
to reflect change and the practitioner is capable of exercising judgement
when applying doctrinal imperatives, all should be well. The difficulty comes
when a doctrinal void arises. Since the solution to insurgencies is found in the
circumstances, not the doctrine, if there is no doctrine, circumstances may
rule unbounded.11 The US Army regards itself as a doctrine-based institution.12 As John Nagl describes, doctrine is:
Enormously important to the United States Army; it codifies both how the
institution thinks about its role in the world and how it accomplishes that role
on the battlefield . . . . Doctrine drives decisions on how the Army should be
organized . . . what missions it should train to accomplish . . . and what equipment it needs. 13

For a doctrine-based army, the “doctrinal gap” in counterinsurgency
must have been deeply troubling.14 Michael Howard once said:
I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the armed
forces are working on now, that they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What matters is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.15

It took some time for the US Army’s counterinsurgency “get it right”
moment to arrive, and the catalyst was the publication of a comprehensive and
adaptive doctrine. The question now is, “is what has been published effective?”
What makes doctrine effective? Some criteria are needed by which
doctrine, of whatever sort, may be judged. 16 At the start of the British Army’s
counterinsurgency doctrine review, this author interviewed a significant portion of the brigade and divisional commanders with Iraq experience, senior
staff officers who had worked in Baghdad, current battalion commanders,
and instructors and students at the Staff College in an attempt to establish a
mutual understanding of doctrine and what these officers and their soldiers
required of it. The expectations these individuals had of doctrine were then
cross-referenced against a more traditional view (from the past) of what doctrine should be. The principal criteria the review identified were:
 Doctrine should be written for and meet the needs of the practitioner.
 Doctrine should be acceptable to its primary audience.
36
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 Doctrine should inform individuals how to think, not prescribe
what to think.
 Doctrine must be teachable.
 Doctrine must be relevant and current.
 Doctrine must be manageable and accessible.

The Audience
Self-evidently, doctrine must be written for the practitioner. That is
not to ignore the wider interest doctrine generates, the arguments it will impact, or the central role it plays in discussion, debate, and disagreement.17 The
doctrine writers have to recognize that doctrine will not be all things to all
people; they need to focus their efforts on the principal audience. The ongoing responses to FM 3-24 prove that point. The fact that FM 3-24 was written
to meet the needs of the soldier in the field and to provide guidance for commanders is clear. The focus of FM 3-24 is the tactical level of warfare, albeit
spanning from corps to battalion in the context of a joint and combined campaign for which doctrinal guidance did not previously exist. 18 This takes the
argument back to the “80 percent political, 20 percent military” concern.
How can doctrine be developed without a clearly articulated joint and
interagency approach? This is not a new problem; Kitson understood it and
highlighted both the importance of interagency work and an understanding of
the need to train for the joint, interagency environment:
The . . . problem is more difficult because so many of the people who will be
most influential in determining success or failure are not in the armed forces at
all. They are the politicians, civil servants, local government officials and police, in the area where the insurgency is taking place, and, as I said earlier, that
may be in someone else’s country . . . . Service officers must be taught how to fit
together a campaign of civil and operational measures; they must know what is
needed in terms of intelligence, and the law, and of moulding public opinion.19

The writer of doctrine should make a sensible assessment of the
ideal and balance it against reality. This balance reflects the dynamic between
the writer and the soldier who has to apply the doctrine in any number of circumstances. Anyone can quote Galula and Kitson and trust that the 80 percent
will be there when required. The reality, however, is that the soldier has to
carry far more of the responsibility than he would wish, being in harm’s way
without the crucial support of civilian agencies that may choose to participate
or not. The soldier on the ground has the responsibility of translating theory
into practice even though some things may be lacking in the doctrinal approach identified. While FM 3-24 explains operational design and the integration of nonmilitary lines of operation into the campaign, an area of
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weakness exists in terms of the absence of doctrine and policy capable of incorporating the full range of all the instruments of national power.

Audience Acceptance
Doctrine should be generally acceptable to its principal audience.
Those who have to execute it should be able to recognize the value of what it
says, balance it against their experience, and assimilate it. Principles and approaches need to make sense in theory and be translatable to sensible practices.
There is an inevitable tension between personal experience and doctrine, particularly when doctrine is produced during the heat of battle. The challenge for
the doctrinal writer is all the greater when a large proportion of his army is
deeply involved in conflict and can legitimately offer the criticism, “that’s not
the war I saw.”20 This doctrinal conundrum can be ameliorated by education
and training.
While some might have been unfamiliar with or skeptical of the
clear-hold-build approach21 and critical of its application in Iraq, it has clearly
identifiable roots based, like all effective doctrine, on experience and sound
analysis. 22 Those familiar with the proposals of Robert Thompson will recognize the concept of clear-hold-winning-won 23 and the methodology Galula
presents in his outstanding, often bitterly realistic view of counterinsurgency.24 Galula, like Thompson, identifies the essential task of securing and
protecting the population, gaining its support, and then acquiring information
to identify and locate insurgents in order to defeat the insurgency.
In terms of the wider audience, it is important to record the manner in
which a broad base of consensus was developed by including a broad spectrum of views: government departments, anthropologists, human rights lawyers, aid workers, and allies. This was a factor General David Petraeus, who
instigated the new US doctrine, recognized from the outset:
A process like this, producing something as important as COIN doctrine, where
so many seem to hold a view, needs engagement with a much wider group than
standard doctrine has traditionally needed. You have to get as many as possible
inside the tent. 25

An important step in the development of the new doctrine was the review conference held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in February 2006. General Petraeus moderated the open, inclusive, high-quality discussion and
debate.26 The result was broad engagement that provided the doctrine with
meaningful substance and a greater sense of investment on the part of those
who were involved. This fora of open discussions and interaction has not prevented an equally wide-range of criticism, but it is abundantly clear that irre38
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spective of these negative comments, there was unanimity in the belief that
change was needed.

Is it Teachable?
Doctrine must be teachable, easily translated into material which
informs discussion and debate, shapes the argument, and creates an intellectual framework that the military student can examine and analyze in an effort
to formulate a concept and then a solution. Get this process wrong and the situation can be difficult to recover. This was the case when the British Army introduced the “Estimate” into its decisionmaking process. As a result of poorly
expressed, overly complicated ideas, there is now a generation of officers
scarred by the experience of having to learn a simple process that was made
impossibly difficult by the measures implemented by the Army.
The importance of education in supporting counterinsurgency doctrine cannot be overemphasized. General Kitson understood this point and influenced several campaigns, generations of Staff College graduates, and
military commanders through his work. 27 Kitson devoted a whole chapter in
his seminal book Low Intensity Operations to education and training, identifying four imperatives that are as valid today as when he wrote them:
 The importance of attuning “men’s minds to cope with the environment of this sort of war.”
 The importance of officers being “taught how to put a campaign
together using a combination of civil and military measures to achieve a single government aim . . . teaching them the value of nonmilitary ways of harming the enemy.”
 The importance of teaching “officers how to direct the activities
of their own soldiers . . . policemen . . . or locally raised forces . . . [in] the right
sort of tactical framework in which to use the techniques to best advantage.”
 The importance of the methods used to teach the techniques themselves, “selecting the right lessons to stress . . . [and] setting the training in such
a way that it makes sense in the context of proper handling of information . . .
within a realistic and instructive framework.”28
Without addressing these imperatives, the likelihood of doctrine being assimilated is problematic.
Doctrine and what is taught should be synonymous; this is especially critical in the case of FM 3-24. The doctrine serves as a keystone document at the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War
College; for brigade and battalion command teams deploying to Iraq; and at
the COIN Center for Excellence at Taji, north of Baghdad. This pedagogy is
an exemplar of Kitson’s model, a methodology of fully supporting the imperative of learn and adapt. 29 These classroom presentations help to explain the
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doctrine, its practical application, and clarifies for those returning to Iraq just
what has changed. Supporting the learn and adapt imperative is worth
examining further, not just in terms of learning from operations per se, but
also learning the valuable lessons of history. John Nagl makes this point, as
does Steven Metz with both authors advocating a broader view than the here
and now. 30

Relevant and Current
Doctrine must be valid, relevant, and current. If not, it will be ignored. Its principles and general application need to be based on sound historical analysis and judgement. As equally important is the requirement that the
doctrine be updated to keep pace with the evolving circumstances or, even
better, it should serve the purpose of setting the agenda and how practitioners
view the battle; as the AirLand Battle concept did in the 1980s. 31 The danger
all doctrine faces is that it can be out of date the moment it is published. Its
usefulness therefore comes from the strength and endurance of its principles
and the general approach it provides. While FM 3-24 is a marked improvement in its description of adversarial groups, the complex spectrum of
adversaries, and the globalized reality of where and how the insurgent and
counterinsurgent may act, there is much more that can be done in these areas.32 The manual needs to “be more explicit about the fact that doctrine is describing a philosophy that is far beyond the classical interpretation of COIN.
It needs to present in bold print who the enemies are and what the lack of government capacity really means for forces trying to counter such threats.” 33
The apparent contradictions between the doctrine in the manual and
some readers’ personal experiences in Iraq and Vietnam may be reflective of
one of the key institutional challenges facing the US Army. Doctrine is of no
value if it is not seen as relevant or is perceived to have a void between theory
and practice. While such perceptions can be addressed through training and
education, this may take considerable time, perhaps as long as ten years, if the
experiences of Vietnam are any indicator. In the meantime, American forces
and the doctrine’s authors will have to weather the storm from the critics.

Manageable and Accessible
The practitioner has to be able to read, understand, and inculcate the
appropriate amount of material that will not leave him overwhelmed or fixated on minutiae. The doctrine writer therefore should strive to strike a balance between the critical imperatives and verbosity. Too little explanation
creates more questions than are answered. Too much information often exceeds the scope of how to think and spills over into what to think, winding up
40
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in the realm of dogma. This is a particular problem when there is a process involved and where trying to apply it dogmatically to the wrong level of command and in the wrong circumstances only creates confusion.
At more than 220 pages, there is an oft-repeated concern about the
manual’s length and the extent of the information covered. Not everyone will
read it cover to cover. The project leader, Conrad Crane, has explained that it
was decided from the outset that the first edition had to include information that
otherwise might have been omitted in order to establish the scope of the subject
matter and to present a baseline of knowledge. General Petraeus’s intent was to
break new ground. The result being the inclusion of some very specific information that could not be found in other references.34 Nevertheless, some consideration had to be given to the casual reader who only intermittently delves
into doctrine, so sections were designed to be standalone references resulting
in more information being included than would otherwise be desirable. In reality, there was a great deal more that might have been included, this relates directly back to the how or what to think debate and the age-old editor’s dilemma:
At what point does doctrine become too descriptive or too prescriptive?
So is a 220-page book accessible to the readership that required it?
FM 3-24 was published on the Internet on 15 December 2006 and was downloaded more than 1.5 million times in the first month. This high level of interest did not address the real issue of how people were to comprehend the
material or what specifically they would take away from it. There is merit in
discussing the effectiveness of posting a 14-megabyte document on the Web.
The University of Chicago Press’s decision to publish FM 3-24 is not only unusual in terms of selecting pure doctrine as a topic but a decision to be applauded for opening the horizons of potential readers.

What’s the Verdict?
The questions of whether the doctrine is acceptable, teachable, relevant and current, manageable, and accessible are all criteria identified as
essential for doctrine to be effective. The principal concern, however, is the
question of whether doctrine is succeeding in the field. It is worthy of noting
that there is a clear link between the doctrine and the policy underpinning operations in Iraq:35
The recently released military doctrinal manual on counterinsurgency operations declares, “The cornerstone of any [counterinsurgency] effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no
permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads.” This statement
encapsulates the wisdom of generations of counterinsurgent theorists and practitioners. The importance of establishing security is manifold. 36
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There can be little doubt that doctrine has to be assimilated if is to be
effective. While the written word is important, the proof is in the circumstances, not the doctrine alone. Doctrine cannot stand alone: It is the sum total
of understanding, experience, training, and resources, applied by means of a
plan, to a specific set of circumstances. If a soldier’s understanding is reasonably complete and is guided by sound doctrine, the likelihood of success is
that much stronger.37 This underlines the importance of the doctrinal approach of “learn and adapt.” After all, things change; to include the broader
context of an insurgency. In the case of the Coalition campaign in Iraq, the efforts taken to produce counterinsurgency doctrine and to recalibrate the training, education, and preparations for deployment appear to be benefiting. The
palpable coherency that exists, underpinned by the clear-hold-build approach, is a clear, vital improvement over the previous disjointed efforts.

The Other 80 Percent
The point was made in the introduction that countering insurgency is
anything but a military problem. The military will normally never account for
more than 20 percent of the solution at best. At worst it may fall a long way
short of that percentage and may even become part of the larger problem. Experience indicates and research supports the contention that if the practitioner’s understanding is genuine, guided by sound doctrine, the likelihood of
success is much greater. 38
But what of the majority shareholder? What of the remaining 80 percent? The US State Department draft 21st Century Counterinsurgency: A
Guide for U.S. Policymakers is a start. Again, as identified in the introduction, the rusty machinery of various government agencies needs an overhaul,
the establishment of a sound doctrinal underpinning is clearly essential. The
publication of FM 3-24 should inspire such efforts. The State Department
draft appears to have the constituent parts, but a sense of purpose seems to be
missing. One of the clear strengths of FM 3-24 is its identification of the population and the legitimacy of the host nation’s government as the primary objectives to secure. These two themes clearly underpin current operations in
Iraq. The policymaker’s guide needs to be equally clear if it is to unify national efforts in a coalition campaign.
In critiquing FM 3-24 an easy approach would be to declare “this is
what doctrine was,” and challenge whether the assumptions it makes are still
valid. There are arguments for and against the classic counterinsurgency principles, whether they are Galula’s, Thompon’s, Kitson’s, or variations on these
doctrinal themes. How to reinterpret these principles is the doctrine writer’s dilemma. Whether one supports the radical revisionist school or the more conventional approach of enduring truths, the landscape has changed markedly.
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The questions remain, to what extent and for what outcome should doctrine be
developed? The answer resounds from any number of sources—from the reality of operations, analysis and apportionment in national capitals, and from
think tanks and wargamers. It is inconceivable that in the future doctrine writers can avoid addressing joint, combined, multinational, and interagency dimensions of complex operations. At present, this responsibility remains the
uncomfortable arena of army-only writing teams, a fact complicated even further by the need to write for its own target audience. It is self-evident that one
part of the 20 percent of the counterinsurgency solution cannot reach across the
other 80 percent span of interests to find resolution. The trick is to get an agreed
mandate for writing a doctrine that draws upon government departments
within the originating nation and between allies and coalition partners.

Conclusion
In his introduction to Kitson’s Low Intensity Operations, General
Sir Michael Carver noted the book was “written for the soldier of today to
help him prepare for the operations of tomorrow.”39 FM 3-24 is not general
enough to be applicable for every future insurgency. The future proposal for a
more expansive effort is something for further discussion. The immediate issue is one of winning the campaigns of today. From an ally’s perspective, US
counterinsurgency doctrine is based on sound classical theory which, with respect to the British model of counterinsurgency, inverts the focus of the last
few years of the twentieth century from emphasis on the insurgent to a greater
understanding of the importance of the population: A doctrinal evolution reflecting the dynamics of interventionist counterinsurgency. It certainly is in
agreement with the British Army view of what effective doctrine should be,
not just because of what it says, but how it clearly translates to effective operations in the field. What more could be asked of doctrine?
On the other hand, the criticisms FM 3-24 drew after its publication
have, for the most part, stood up to examination. That some commentaries
have been critical is not the issue. What matters is whether the process of assimilating the lessons of FM 3-24, based on recent experiences in Iraq and
stretching back some 60 years, meets the needs of the practitioner. If reports
from authors like Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack are to be believed,
the real-life application of the new doctrine is succeeding:
Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally
getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have
harshly criticized the Bush administration’s miserable handling of Iraq, we were
surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily “victory” but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with.40
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At the counterinsurgency doctrine workshop at Fort Leavenworth
in February 2006, plenary discussions returned time and again to the important, oft-repeated point that counterinsurgency takes time, people, patience,
resolve, and money. For that reason alone, the new doctrine is valuable:
There is no basis for any expectation of rapid success in counterinsurgency.
Whatever its failings, omissions, oversimplifications, and misunderstandings, FM 3-24 provides the intellectual foundation for success. The manual
is beginning to shape the development of counterinsurgency doctrine capable of meeting future challenges. From this ally’s point of view, it is presently doing its job. It is serving the military’s purpose, but that purpose can
only be fully met in the context of the 80 percent political, 20 percent military balance. Addressing the other 80 percent is the next and, perhaps most
critical, step.
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